ABSTRACT: The majority of criminal cases are decided through plea bargaining and probability discounting (i.e., the change in the value of an outcome as it becomes less probable) may aid in the understanding of this process. University students were asked to complete a probability-discounting task involving three legal and two monetary outcomes. Groups were divided in terms of the race of the defendant and the participant's sex. Results showed that the plea bargain in the case of murder was discounted more steeply than the other crime scenarios, that the predictions of the leading theory of plea bargaining (i.e., decision theory) were inaccurate, and that males and females discounted differently (only) when the recipient was African American (regardless of the type of outcome). The present results have theoretical and practical implications and should serve to highlight the utility of studying plea bargaining within a probability-discounting framework.
The process of discounting involves the subjective change in the value of an outcome because the delivery of that outcome is either delayed or uncertain (see Madden & Bickel, 2010 , for a review). In the former case, the process is called temporal or delay discounting; in the latter case it is called probability discounting. In either case, the rate at which an individual is said to discount is determined by how quickly the value of the outcome changes as it becomes increasingly delayed or uncertain.
Many psychologists have been interested in the phenomenon of discounting because the rate at which people discount has been shown to be correlated with the presence of several different types of disorders, such as pathological gambling (see Petry & Madden, 2010) , substance abuse (see Yi, Mitchell, & Bickel, 2010) , and attention deficit / hyperactivity disorder (see Williams, 2010) . However, the application of discounting goes well beyond its link to psychological disorders. Researchers have applied the phenomenon to health decision-making (e.g., Chapman, 1996) , environmental issues (e.g., Hardisty & Weber, 2009) , and overall strategies for increasing the display of self-control (e.g., Logue, 1995) .
The concept of discounting has been applied to legal decision-making, although not always under the title of "discounting." For instance, prosecutors are often put in a position in which discounting is applicable, such as offering plea bargains. If the defendant is convicted, then s/he studies have documented a consistent effect of race of the defendant (for reviews see Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 2005; Sommers, 2007) and/or the juror (e.g., Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000 ) on juror's verdicts. Likewise, research has also reported that these decisions can vary as a function of the sex of the juror (e.g., Hughes & Tuch, 2003; Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout, 1994; Pozzulo, Dempsey, Maeder, & Allen, 2010) . Are similar effects observed with plea bargains? When one considers that roughly 90% of guilty verdicts are decided through plea bargaining rather than trial (Pastore & Maguire, 2003) , determining the answer to this question could have a broad impact.
The literature is not devoid of research on the topic. Edkins (2011) found that defense attorneys rated obtainable pleas for minority defendants to be significantly longer and to include more jail time than they did for Caucasian defendants after controlling for the guilt of the defendants. Thus, existing evidence suggests that plea bargaining may be under stimulus control of factors such as race of the defendant.
The present study was designed to accomplish several things. The first was to replicate two findings reported by Weatherly et al. (2012) . The first was that, when making a decision from the prosecutor's perspective, steeper rates of discounting (i.e., risk aversion; lessening the chance of receiving nothing) would be observed for plea bargains that involved the crime of murder than for the crime of embezzlement. The second was that observed rates of discounting would differ from those predicted by decision theory. Next, the study was also designed to determine if rates of discounting would vary as a function of the race of the defendant who was to be the recipient of the potential outcome (e.g., plea bargain) and/or the sex of the participant doing the discounting.
Given the previous literature in this area, we predicted that the crime of murder would be the most steeply discounted outcome in the legal scenarios tested (i.e., participants' decisionmaking, again from a prosecutorial perspective, would be most risk-averse when the crime was murder). Likewise we predicted that the observed rates of discounting would vary significantly from that predicted by decision theory. Next, given that research has suggested that plea bargains are less favorable for minority, than for Caucasian, defendants, we predicted that less discounting would be observed when the hypothetical recipient of the outcome was from a minority ethnic group than if the recipient was Caucasian (i.e., participants' decision-making with be most riskprone when the defendant was an ethnic minority). Given that females have been shown to have a tendency toward more tolerant racial attitudes than males (see Hughes & Tuch, 2003) , we predicted that females would display steeper rates of discounting than males (i.e., their decisionmaking would be more risk-averse than that of males).
Finally, we also predicted a race of defendant by type of crime interaction. Research (e.g., Sunnafrank & Fontes, 1983) has indicated that participants view minority (e.g., African American) individuals as more closely related to certain crimes, such as assault and grand theft auto, than Caucasians. However, Caucasians are more associated with other crimes, such as embezzlement, than are minorities. Thus, we predicted the largest race effect to be observed with the crime of murder and the smallest race effect (or even a reversed effect) for the outcome of embezzlement.
Method

Participants
The participants were 311 (244 female; 67 male) university students enrolled in a psychology course at the University of North Dakota. The mean age of the participants was 20.0 years (SD = 3.4 years) and the mean self-reported grade point average was 3.3 out of 4.0 (SD = 0.5). The vast majority of the participants (287; 92.3%) self-reported as Caucasian. Participants received (extra) course credit in return for their participation.
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed all of the materials online using a data-management system (SONA Systems, Ltd; Version 2.72; Tallinn, Estonia). This system tracked participation in the study at an individual level and thereby ensured that an individual could complete the materials only one time even if s/he was enrolled in multiple psychology courses. The first item presented to every potential participant was an explanation of the study as approved by the Institutional Review Board at the University of North Dakota. A participant's continuation in the study beyond this first item constituted the participant granting informed consent.
Participants were randomly divided into three groups. The groups differed in terms of whether the hypothetical recipient of the outcomes (i.e., the defendant) in the discounting task was an African-American male (n = 108), an American-Indian male (n = 102), or a Caucasian male (n = 101). These race manipulations were made for the following reasons. The research literature has numerous examples of differences in decision-making as a function of whether the defendant is African American or Caucasian. The largest minority group in the region where the study was conducted, however, is American Indians. Therefore, three racial groups were included in the procedure. With exception of the race of the hypothetical recipient of the probabilistic outcomes (i.e., the defendant), every participant completed the identical materials.
Each participant completed a short demographic questionnaire. This questionnaire asked participants about the information reported in the participants section.
Each participant also completed a probability-discounting task that involved five different outcomes. The outcomes were a plea bargain in an embezzlement case, a settlement in a discrimination case, a plea bargain in a murder case, winning $1,000 in a national sweepstakes, and winning $100,000 in a national sweepstakes. In each of the legal scenarios, it was overtly stated that the crime had been committed. Likewise, the participant was asked to make a decision based on the prosecutor's point of view, so the "full outcome" was obtaining the maximum possible sentence/settlement. For the sweepstakes outcomes, the "full outcome" would by the hypothetical recipient receiving the entire amount of money (i.e., $1,000 or $100,000). In all five scenarios, the hypothetical recipient of the outcome in the scenario was male. The three groups differed in terms of whether that male was described as African American, American Indian, or Caucasian. The exact wording of each question can be found in the Appendix.
The legal outcomes were chosen for the following reason. The outcomes of embezzlement and murder were used in Weatherly et al. (2012) and were therefore used for purposes of replication. The crime of discrimination was used because the authors believed that this manipulation would maximize the manipulation of the independent variable of race of the hypothetical defendant. The two different monetary amounts were used as a manipulation check.
That is, given the magnitude effect (i.e., Estle et al., 2006; Thaler, 1981) , one would expect to observe steeper rates of probability discounting for winning $100,000 than for winning $1,000 (i.e., participants' decision-making would be more conservative with the larger than the smaller monetary amount). Also, hypothetical amounts of money, rather than legal outcomes, are the most common outcomes in studies of discounting (see Madden & Bickel, 2010) . Thus, if race effects were going to be observed, having monetary outcomes allowed for the determination of whether such effects extended beyond legal outcomes.
Participants answered five questions about each discounting outcome, with the questions differing in terms of the probability of the outcome. The five probabilities were 1, 10, 50, 90, and 99%. These probabilities were used because they provided a wide range of probabilities and also were used in Weatherly et al. (2012) .
In answering each discounting question, the participant selected from 51 possible responses that ranged from 100% to 0% of the full outcome in 2% increments (presented in money or years, depending on the question). This type of data collection is a version of the multiple-choice method (Beck & Triplett, 2009 ). Although not the most commonly used method of collecting discounting data (see Madden & Bickel, 2010) , the multiple-choice method has shown to produce both reliable and interpretable data (e.g., Beck & Triplett, 2009; Weatherly & Derenne, 2013) .
The five different discounting outcomes were presented in serial order. That is, participants completed all five questions pertaining to a particular outcome before another type of outcome was presented. The order of the five probabilities varied randomly across questions. The order that the different outcomes were presented to participants also varied randomly across participants. Likewise, the placement of the demographic questionnaire also varied randomly across participants (i.e., the demographic questionnaire was not always presented first, but could appear between the different discounting outcomes or after the discounting task altogether).
Data Preparation and Analysis
The discounting data were analyzed by calculating the area under the discounting curve (AUC) using the formula presented by Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana (2001) :
With this formula, AUC is calculated by summing the area of each successive trapezoid created by the indifference points (i.e., participants' responses) across the five probabilities for each outcome. In the current study, x was calculated in terms of odds against the outcome occurring. The resulting sum is then transformed into a proportion, with large proportions (i.e., AUC values) indicating little to no probability discounting, which can be interpreted as a tendency toward risk proneness (i.e., preferring a large amount of the outcome despite a high chance of not getting anything). Small proportions indicate steep probability discounting and can be interpreted as a tendency toward risk aversion (i.e., preferring a small amount of the outcome rather than risking not getting anything).
AUC is not the only way to analyze discounting data (see Madden & Bickel, 2010) . However, unlike other methods, AUC does not presuppose the form that the discounting data
should take (e.g., a hyperbola). AUC values are also calculated directly from the participants' responses rather than being estimated. Finally, AUC values are typically normally distributed and do not require transformation before statistical analyses can be performed, which is not the case of some other methods of analyzing discounting data.
The resulting AUC values were used as the dependent measure for discounting of each of the five hypothetical outcomes. These values were subjected to a three-way (Recipient's race X Participant's sex X Type of Outcome) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA). The hypothetical recipient's race and the participant's sex served as between-group variables. The five different outcomes served as repeated measures. When significant effects were observed, appropriate ad hoc analyses were conducted. Results for these analyses were considered significant at p < .05.
Decision theory predicts that the acceptable length/size of a plea bargain will be the product of the probability of conviction and the maximum penalty. Thus, it would predict that, for each of the legal scenarios used in this study, the mean response would be 50% of the maximum sentence/fine.
3 Thus, to test the predictions of decision theory, the mean response to each legal scenario was subjected to a one-sample t test against the expected value of .50 (i.e., 50%). A two-tailed test was employed because we did not have theoretical reason to predict the direction that a potential difference would be observed. Also, similar t tests were conducted at the most extreme probabilities (i.e., 1 & 99%) to determine if decision making conformed to the predictions of decision theory when the chance of conviction was near zero or almost certain. Because these analyses involved the same data used in the above ANOVA, a Bonferroni adjustment was made to guard against Type I errors. This adjustment lowered the threshold for statistical significance to p < .002.
Results
Figure 1 displays the AUC values that were observed across the different races of the hypothetical recipient for the five different outcomes as a function of the sex of the participant doing the discounting. The male/female breakdown for each group was 19/89, 25/77, and 23/78 for the African-American, American-Indian, and Caucasian recipient groups, respectively. The data in Figure 1 indicate that rates of discounting tended to vary across the five different outcomes. Differences in discounting as a function of race of the recipient or of sex of the participant are not overtly obvious, with one exception. Specifically, differences in discounting as a function of participant's sex are visually apparent when, and seemingly only when, the recipient of the outcome was African American. Under those conditions, male participants displayed steeper rates of discounting (i.e., greater risk aversion) across all of the outcomes relative to female participants. Phrased differently, males indicated they would accept a lesser amount of the outcome (e.g., shorter pleas) rather than risking gaining the full outcome than did the females.
Results of the three-way ANOVA were consistent with these impressions. The main effect of type of outcome was significant, F(4, 1220) = 6.65, p < .001, partial η 2 = .021. Tukey HSD post hoc tests indicated that, in terms of the legal scenarios, the murder plea bargain (AUC = .34; SD = .31) was discounted significantly more (i.e., decision-making was more risk-averse) than either the embezzlement (AUC = .40; SD = .32) or discrimination (AUC = .39; SD = .31) plea bargains. Likewise, winning $100,000 (AUC = .32; SD = .30) was discounted significantly more than winning $1,000 (AUC = .35, SD = .29), indicating that participants' decision-making became more conservative as the monetary amount increased.
Neither the main effect of recipient's (i.e., defendant's) race, F(2, 305) = 1.09, p = .338, partial η 2 = .007, nor of participant's sex, F(1, 305) = 2.54, p = .112, η 2 = .021, reached statistical significance. However, the interaction between recipient's race and participant's sex was significant, F(2, 305) = 3.63, p = .028, partial η 2 = .023. Tukey HSD post hoc tests indicated that males discounted the outcomes to a significantly greater degree than females when the recipient of the outcome was African American. In other words, females, not males, displayed more riskproneness in their decision-making when the recipient/defendant was African American. Discounting by males and females did not differ when the recipient of the outcome was American Indian or Caucasian. None of the other interactions approached or reached statistical significance.
When the mean proportion of the five responses for each of the legal outcomes was subjected to a one-sample t test, the results indicated that the values varied significantly from .50 for the embezzlement (Mean = .59; t(1, 310) = 9.35, p <.001) and discrimination (Mean = .62, t(1, 310) = 13.98, p < .001) scenarios, but not the murder (Mean = .53, t(1, 310) = 2.09, p = .037) scenario. When the data were reanalyzed separately as a function of the recipient's race, mean response values were significantly higher than .50 in the embezzlement and discrimination scenarios regardless of the recipient's race. The mean response values in the murder scenario, however, did not differ from 0.5, again regardless of the recipient's race. When the data were analyzed independently according the participant's gender, females' mean response values were significantly higher than .50 in all three scenarios. Males' mean response values were significantly higher than .50 for the embezzlement and discrimination scenarios, but their mean response in the murder scenario was exactly .50.
Finally, to test the predictions of decision theory at the most extreme likelihoods, onesample t tests were conducted on the participants' responses in the legal scenarios when the probability of the outcome was either 1 or 99%. When the chances of the outcome were 1%, participants' mean response was significantly higher than 1% of the full outcome in each of the embezzlement, t(1, 310) = 15.87, p < .001, discrimination, t(1, 310) = 16.36, p < .001, and murder scenarios, t(1, 310) = 14.75, p < .001. When the chances of the outcome were 99%, participants' mean response was significantly lower than 99% of the full outcome in each of the embezzlement, t(1, 310) = -10.98, p < .001, discrimination, t(1, 310) = -7.64, p < .001, and murder scenarios, t(1, 310) = -15.87, p < .001. Thus, participants' decision-making was significantly more risk prone than predicted by decision theory when the probability of conviction was extremely low and significantly more risk averse than predicted by decision theory when the probability of conviction was extremely high.
Discussion
The first goal of the present study was to replicate the findings of Weatherly et al. (2012) in terms of differences in rates of probability discounting of different crimes and differences in responding relative to the predictions of decision theory. In both cases the replication was successful. Weatherly et al. reported that participants discounted a plea bargain in a murder case at a steeper rate than they did a plea bargain in an embezzlement case. The present study found the same. Further, the present results also indicated that participants discounted plea bargains in a murder case to a significantly greater extent than they did a settlement in a discrimination case. No differences were observed in rates of probability discounting between the embezzlement and discrimination scenarios.
Also similar to the results of Weatherly et al. (2012) , the average response in the legal scenarios tested in the present study differed from what would be predicted by decision theory (i.e., probability of conviction multiplied by the maximum penalty/sentence). The results showed that participants' responses at an extremely low probability of conviction were more risk prone than would be predicted by decision theory and their responses at an extremely high probability of conviction were more risk averse than would be predicted. These findings also replicate those reported by Weatherly et al. (2012) .
Although the present study did find that participants average responses differed significantly from what would be predicted by decision theory, there is one interesting deviation from the results reported by Weatherly et al. (2012) . Weatherly et al. reported that the average response to the embezzlement scenario was significantly higher than .50 and the average response to the murder scenario was significantly lower than .50. In the present study, the average response to all of the legal scenarios was never significantly lower than .50.
Why this difference in response to the murder scenario between the studies was observed is open to question. At least two procedural aspects of the present study may have contributed to the different results. In Weatherly et al. (2012) , the legal scenarios described an ambiguous defendant who was not identified by sex or race. The scenarios used in the present study always identified the defendant as male and of a specific race. Whether or not these pieces of information contributed to why participants were more risk prone in the murder case in the present study than were participants in Weatherly et al. study may be a fruitful topic for future research.
The deviations from decision theory at the extreme probabilities are not theoretically novel. For instance, they would be predicted by major theories of decision making (e.g., prospect theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . However, because they were observed in a legal context, they do have practical implications. It seems reasonable to think that plea bargaining is most apt to occur at these probabilities (i.e., the prosecutor thinks that s/he has very little chance of securing a conviction if the case goes to trial or the defendant thinks that being convicted is almost guaranteed). Thus, the present results might suggest that a prosecutor might be able to successfully offer a plea bargain with stiffer consequences than would be predicted by decision theory in situations in which the actual chance of conviction is very low. On the other hand, one would also want to be aware of the tendency to offer plea bargains that are not as stiff as would be predicted by decision theory when the actual chance of conviction is very high.
One could of course argue that such a generalization should be made with caution because the participants were university students, not trained prosecutors. While that caution should be taken seriously, it should also be noted that research has indicated that biases in decision-making exist in the professional population (e.g., Banji & Greenwald, 2013) . It is also the case that research using university students as participants to study legal issues has shown to have good ecological validity (e.g., Bornstein, 1999) . Thus, the above generalization should not be completely ignored.
The second goal of the present study was to determine whether probability discounting in legal (and non-legal) scenarios would vary as a function of the race of the recipient of the outcome (i.e., the defendant). Overall, the data suggest that discounting did not vary in the predicted way. A third goal was to determine if discounting would vary as a function of the sex of the participant doing the discounting. Again, overall, the data suggest that discounting did not vary as predicted.
The above conclusions apply to the main effects of recipient's race and respondent's sex. That point is important because a significant interaction was observed between those two variables. When the recipient of the outcome was African American, male and female participants discounted the outcomes differently, with males displaying significantly steeper rates of probability discounting than females. That is, males' decision-making was more risk averse than was that of the females. Importantly, this difference was observed across all outcomes, both legal and non-legal.
Before drawing major conclusions about this result, one would want future research to determine its reliability. With that said, there are several aspects of the present data set that would indicate that the data were not aberrant. First, the results from the legal outcomes largely replicated previously published data (Weatherly et al., 2012) . Second, significant magnitude effects (e.g., Estle et al., 2006; Thaler, 1981) were observed in the predicted direction for both the legal and non-legal outcomes. Thus, there seems to be no obvious reason to believe the present data are flawed in some way.
So how does one interpret the sex difference observed when the recipient of the outcome is African American? Steep rates of probability discounting indicate a tendency toward risk aversion. Thus, one could interpret the steep rates of discounting observed in male participants as an indication that males tended to be more lenient than females in their decisions about African American recipients. However, steep rates of discounting might also represent a conservative viewpoint (i.e., guaranteeing that the African American receives at least some punishment for committing a crime & receiving less money in situations such as sweepstakes). Shallow rates of probability discounting indicate a tendency towards risk proneness. Thus, one could interpret the shallow rates of discounting observed in female participants as an indication that females tended to be more aggressive than males in their decisions about African American recipients. However, shallow rates of discounting might also represent a greater willingness for the African American recipient to experience the full outcome. Future research will be needed to parse these possibilities, but the existing literature (see Hughes & Tuch, 2003; Murrell et al., 1994; Wuensch, Campbell, Kesler, & Moore, 2002) would suggest that the last of them is perhaps the most likely explanation.
Several aspects of the present procedure should promote caution when interpreting the overall results. For one, the participants were university students and most were young and/or Caucasian. Thus, one cannot assume that the same results would have been observed had a more diverse sample been employed. One could also potentially criticize the fact that a complete factorial design was not employed. That is, sex of the recipient and race of the participant were not studied. The latter of these is a practical issue; the researchers do not have ready access to large numbers of African American or American Indian individuals to serve as potential participants. However, even if one is to make this criticism, it does not detract from the significant effects that were observed.
One could also criticize the fact that the study employed far more female than male participants. This fact is also somewhat dictated by the participant pool to which the researchers have access. However, one can counter this particular criticism by pointing out that significant effects of sex of the participant were observed despite the lower number of male, than female, participants.
It was also the case that the procedure utilized hypothetical scenarios. Such a procedure is perhaps necessary given that experimentally manipulating actual legal cases is both unfeasible and unethical. However, it should be noted that some research suggests that rates of probability discounting can vary as a function of whether the outcome being discounted is hypothetical or real (e.g., Hinvest & Anderson, 2010; Lawyer, Schoepflin, & Jenks, 2011) . Thus, the present results should be interpreted with this knowledge in mind.
It should also be noted that although significant results were found, the observed effect sizes for those results were relatively small (see Cohen, 1988) . Thus, although participants displayed different rates of discounting for the different outcomes, and a recipient's race by participant's sex interaction was observed, a large portion of the variance in how people discount remains unexplained. Phrased another way, there are other factors besides the type of outcome, recipient of the outcome, and the discounter's sex that determine what rate of probability discounting will be observed.
As noted above, the vast majority of guilty verdicts are decided through plea bargains (Pastore & Maguire, 2003) . Thus, understanding the factors that influence what plea bargains are offered and accepted can potentially help improve our legal system. The present results join those of Weatherly et al. (2012) in demonstrating that the predictions of the leading theory in the area (i.e., decision theory) are not accurate. Likewise, they also lend credence to the idea of studying plea bargaining within a probability-discounting framework, as such a framework allows for numerous variables to be manipulated and direct tests of predictions to be made.
One area that researchers might want to pursue is how plea bargains are influenced by the likelihood that the crime has been committed by the accused. That is, in both Weatherly et al. (2012) and the present study, the scenarios explicitly stated that the crime had been committed by the person described. In reality, the probability that the accused individual actually committed the crime may be less than 1.0. It seems reasonable to think that this factor would influence the plea-bargain process and future work in this area may be able to shed light on exactly how and by how much.
